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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK: TARP
RULES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TRIGGER
BROADER RISK ASSESSMENT OF
COMPENSATION POLICIES
MICHAEL S. MELBINGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The world of executive compensation will never be the
same for financial institutions after 2009. In fact, due to the crisis
in the world's financial markets in 2009, the world of executive
compensation most likely will never be the same for any publicly
traded corporation. Looking for a scapegoat for the near collapse
in the world's financial markets, many in the government and
media (both in the U.S. and Europe), sought to blame the
compensation policies of financial institutions. Therefore,
limitations and restrictions on executive compensation became a
central part of the legislation proposed and adopted in response to
the financial crisis.
This Article will focus on the new requirement that
companies assess their executive compensation plans and
agreements to determine whether they encourage excessive risk
taking. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA),
signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008, first created
this requirement for financial institutions that received federal
funds under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP).
Thereafter, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA),2 signed into law by President Obama on February 17,
2009, included amendments to the executive compensation
provisions of the EESA. Next an Interim Final Rule interpreting
* Mr. Melbinger is a Partner at Winston & Strawn LLP in Chicago, Illinois.
1. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008).
2. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001,
123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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Section 111 of the EESA was published by the Treasury
Department in the Federal Register on June 15, 2009.3
While the EESA imposed executive compensation limits
on financial institutions that are recipients of TARP funds, on
October 27, 2009 the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) issued
Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies
(Guidance) that is designed to effect all financial institutions.4 The
Fed's requirements so far are only a proposal but outline key
requirements that could be a mainstay even after financial
institutions have exited TARP.
The influence of the executive compensation provisions
affecting financial institutions receiving TARP funds were further
extended on December 15, 2009, when the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a new Final Rule on
executive compensation disclosure and corporate governance that
applies risk assessment requirements similar to those under TARP
to all publicly traded companies, beginning in 2010.' The SEC's
Final Rule requires all public companies to assess their
compensation policies and practices to determine if they are
reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the
institution. This Article will examine the process that companies
should employ to assess properly the risk associated with executive
compensation.
One of the primary reasons TARP recipients such as
Citigroup and Bank of America have sought to pay back their
share of funds received is to escape the executive compensation
limits imposed by the EESA.6 For Bank of America in particular
the limitations on executive compensation were a hindrance in its
ability to find a new CEO.7 In order to attract top quality
candidates Bank of America needed to escape the limitations and
3. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30).
4. Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 74 Fed. Reg.
55,227 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Sound Incentive Compensation].
5. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240,249 and 274).
6. BofA Repays All of Government Bailout Funds, MSNBC.coM, Dec. 10, 2009,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34350133/ ns/business-us business/.
7. Id.
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meddling of regulators. Newly proposed legislation and the
Guidance could prove to make the repayment of TARP funds only
a temporary solution, as new legislation could place all publicly
traded corporations under executive compensation limitations.
Part II of this article will discuss the limitations on
executive compensation imposed by the EESA for financial
institutions that receive TARP funds.8 Part III is a discussion of
the Fed's Guidance on incentive compensation policies for all
financial institutions.9  Part IV sets forth the SEC rules on
executive compensation and corporate governance that apply to
all public companies. ° Part V provides a look at other proposed
executive compensation legislation and the limitations being
considered." Part VI will offer a discussion on executive
compensation risk assessment and provides an overview of key
considerations and procedures necessary to ensure that an
accurate and proper assessment is conducted.12
II. THE LIMITATIONS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS RECEIVING TARP FUNDS
Section 111 of EESA, as amended by ARRA,"3 imposed a
variety of new limitations and restrictions on the executive
compensation plans and arrangements of any entity that received
financial assistance under TARP. These restrictions and standards
apply throughout the period during which any obligation arising
from financial assistance provided under TARP remains
outstanding (TARP obligation period).
8. See infra Part II, pp. 61-70.
9. See infra Part III, pp. 70-78.
10. See infra Part IV, pp. 78-88.
11. See infra Part V, pp. 88-91.
12. See infra Part VI, pp. 91-101.
13. 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2010).
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A. Prohibition on Executive Compensation Programs that
Create Excessive Risk
EESA Section 111(b)(3) requires that each TARP
recipient meet appropriate standards for executive compensation
and corporate governance, including:
Limits on compensation that exclude incentives for
senior executive officers of the TARP recipient to
take unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten
the value of such recipient during the period in
which any obligation arising from financial
assistance provided under the TARP remains
outstanding. 4
The term "senior executive officer" (SEO) is defined as
"an individual who is [one] of the top [five] most highly paid
executives of a public company, whose compensation is required
to be disclosed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and any regulations issued thereunder, and non-public company
counterparts."
5
B. Prohibition on Compensation Plans that Encourage
Manipulation of Earnings
Closely related to the limits on compensation incentives for
risk taking by SEOs, is a provision that prohibits TARP recipients
from maintaining "any compensation plan that would encourage
manipulation of the reported earnings of such TARP recipient to
enhance the compensation of any of its employees.' ' 16 This
prohibition applies to all employees, including those below the
SEO level.
14. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, § 7001, 123 Stat. at 517.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 518-19.
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C. Compensation Committee Composed of Independent
Directors
Publicly traded TARP recipients must establish a
Compensation Committee of the board of directors, for reviewing
employee compensation plans, comprised entirely of independent
directors. 7 TARP requires this Committee to "meet at least
semiannually to discuss and evaluate employee compensation
plans in light of an assessment of any risk posed to the TARP
recipient by such plans.' 8 Most publicly traded companies already
have structured their compensation committee to satisfy the
"outside director" requirements of Section 162(m) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986,'9 as amended (Code), the independence
requirements of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193420 (Exchange Act), and the director independence
requirements of the individual stock exchanges.
In the case of TARP recipients that are not publicly traded
and that have not received in excess of $25,000,000 of financial
assistance through TARP, the company's board of directors must
carry out the duties of the Compensation Committee outlined
above.21
D. Recovery of any Compensation Paid Based on Inaccurate
Financial Information
ARRA requires TARP recipients to implement
"clawback" provisions to recover bonuses, retention awards, or
incentive compensation paid to any SEO or any of the next twenty
most highly compensated employees based on statements of
earnings, revenues, gains, or other criteria that are later found to
17. Id. at 519.
18. Id.
19. Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2006).
20. Securities Exchange Act of 1943 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
21. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, § 7001, 123 Stat. at 519.
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be materially inaccurate." The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposed
narrower clawback provisions back in 2 0 02 .3
E. Prohibition on "Golden Parachute Payments"
TARP prohibits affected institutions from making "golden
parachute payments," or severance payments, to a SEO or any of
the next five most highly compensated employees during the
TARP obligation period.24 Importantly, the EESA and ARRA
expand the original definition of the term "golden parachute
payment" to include "any payment to a senior executive officer
upon departure from a company for any reason, except for
payments for services performed or benefits accrued.""
F. Prohibition on Bonus, Retention Award, or Incentive
Compensation
ARRA prohibits TARP recipients from paying or accruing
any bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation during the
TARP obligation period.26 However, this prohibition provides an
exception for the payment of long-term restricted stock by the
TARP recipient, provided that such long-term restricted stock (i)
does not fully vest during the TARP obligation period; (ii) has a
value that does not exceed one third of the receiving employee's
total annual compensation; and (iii) is subject to such other terms
22. Id. at 517.
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006) (If an issuer is required to
prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer,
as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the
securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer shall
reimburse the issuer for-
"(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based compensation received
by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period following
the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first
occurs) of the financial document embodying such financial reporting
requirement; and (2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of
the issuer during that 12-month period.").
24. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, § 7001, 123 Stat. at 517.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 518.
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and conditions as the Secretary of the Treasury may determine is
in the public interest. 2' Because of this prohibition, most TARP
recipients have increased base salary and maximum restricted
stock awards to match approximately the level of compensation
the institution paid to affected SEOs before the TARP limitations
applied.
The scope of this prohibition on bonus, retention award, or
incentive compensation depends on the amount of financial
assistance that a TARP recipient received. For any institution that
received less than $25,000,000 under TARP, the prohibition is
limited to the most highly compensated employee of that
institution.8 However, with respect to an institution that received
TARP assistance of $500,000,000 or more, the prohibition on
bonus, retention award, or incentive compensation applies to all
the SEOs and the next twenty most highly-compensated
employees,29 or such higher number of employees as the Secretary
of the Treasury may determine is in the public interest with respect
to the TARP recipient.3
ARRA provides an exemption from the prohibition
outlined above for any "bonus payment required to be paid
pursuant to a written employment contract executed on or before
Februaryll, 2009," which the Secretary of the Treasury
determines to be valid.31
G. Limitation on "Luxury" Expenditures
TARP requires the board of directors of TARP recipients
to establish a company-wide policy regarding excessive or luxury
expenditures.32 Under TARP, this policy should include excessive
expenditures on:
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, § 7001, 123 Stat. at 518.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 519.
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(a) entertainment or events:
(b) office and facility renovations;
(c) aviation or other transportation services; or
(d) other activities or events that are not reasonable
expenditures for conferences, staff development,
reasonable performance incentives, or other similar
measures conducted in the normal course of the
company's business operations.33
The Interim Final Rule requires the board of directors of a
TARP recipient to provide its excessive or luxury expenditures
policy to the Treasury, its primary regulatory agency, and post the
text of the policy on its website.3
H. Say on Pay
Any proxy or consent for a shareholder meeting of a TARP
recipient during the TARP obligation period must permit a
separate shareholder vote to approve the compensation of
executives, as disclosed under the SEC compensation disclosure
rules.35 This shareholder vote will not be binding on the company's
board of directors, will not be construed as overruling a decision
by the board, and will not create or imply any additional fiduciary
duty of the board.36 However, some institutional investor advisory
services have stated that they will vote against the board of
directors of any company that ignores a shareholder resolution
that receives majority support.
ARRA required the SEC to promulgate a final rule
regarding this provision within one year of the date of enactment.
On February 26, 2009, the SEC issued preliminary guidance
indicating that the provision calls for a shareholder vote on
executive compensation.3 1 "A shareholder proposal on "say on
33. Id.
34. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 28,417.
35. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, § 7001, 123 Stat. at 519.
36. Id.
37. SEC, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Feb. 26, 2009,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ guidance/arrainterp.htm.
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pay" that only asks the company to adopt a policy providing for
annual shareholder votes on executive compensation in the future
would not satisfy this requirement. 38 The ARRA requires an
actual, non-binding vote by the shareholders to approve executive
compensation.3 9 The SEC's preliminary guidance also provided
that despite the clarity of the language "shall permit," ARRA
"does not condition the requirement for a vote on the receipt of a
shareholder proposal on approving executive compensation.,
40
The law is intended to provide shareholders with a yearly vote to
41
approve the compensation of executives.
I. Limit on Deductibility of Compensation
TARP amends Code section 162(m)(5) to impose a
$500,000 cap on the deductibility of annual compensation for each
SEO of a TARP recipient.42 While this limit technically applies
only during the TARP obligation period, it also limits the
deductibility of deferred compensation paid to a SEO in a future
year, where the compensation is paid in a year not subject to the
TARP limits but was earned during a year in which the TARP
limits were in place. Additionally, the new definition eliminates
the exception for performance-based compensation, which is
contrary to everything that proponents of good corporate
governance have worked for since 2004.
J. Required Review of Prior Payments to Executives
ARRA requires that the Secretary of the Treasury review
"bonuses, retention awards, and other compensation paid to the
senior executive officers and the next 20 most highly-compensated
employees of each entity receiving TARP assistance before the
date of enactment of the [ARRA], to determine whether any such
payments were inconsistent with the purposes of this section or the
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, § 7001, 123 Stat. at 517.
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TARP or were otherwise contrary to the public interest."43
ARRA further requires that, if the Secretary determines that any
such payments were inconsistent with the purposes of this section
or the TARP or were otherwise contrary to the public interest, the
Secretary of the Treasury must engage in negotiations with the
TARP recipient and the receiving employee for reimbursements
to the federal government regarding the compensation or
bonuses."
The Interim Final Rule seems to limit this requirement to
employees of TARP recipients receiving exceptional financial
assistance. Providing that for any period during which a TARP
recipient is designated as having received exceptional financial
assistance, the TARP recipient must gain the approval of the
Special Master for all compensation payments to, and
compensation structures for, SEOs, executive officers (as defined
under the Securities and Exchange Act, Rule 3b-7), and the 100
most highly compensated employees.45
K. CEO and CFO Certification Requirements
ARRA requires the CEO and CFO (or their equivalents)
of a TARP recipient to provide a written certification of
compliance with the foregoing requirements. 46 Publicly traded
companies must file these certifications with the SEC along with
annual filings required under securities laws.47 Private companies
are required to file their certifications with the Secretary of the
Treasury. 48
L. Perquisite Disclosure
During the TARP period, a TARP recipient must disclose
annually any perquisite whose total value for the TARP recipient's
43. Id. at 520.
44. Id.
45. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 28,416.
46. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, § 7001, 123 Stat. at 519.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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fiscal year exceeds $25,000 for each of the SEOs and a specified
number of other highly compensated employees, with the number
of affected employees based on the amount of assistance
received.49 Within 120 days of the completion of a fiscal year any
part of which is a TARP period, the TARP recipient must provide
the Treasury Department and its primary regulatory agency with a
narrative description of the amount and nature of these
perquisites, the recipient of these perquisites, and a justification
for offering these perquisites including a perquisite offered with a
value that does not exceed $25,000.50
M. Compensation Consultant Disclosure
TARP requires the compensation committee of the board
of directors of the TARP recipient to provide annually a narrative
description of whether the TARP recipient, the board of directors,
or the compensation committee of the board has engaged a
compensation consultant. The narrative must provide a
description of "all types of services, including non-compensation
related services, the compensation consultant or any of its affiliates
has provided to the TARP recipient, the board, or the
compensation committee during the past three years, including any
'benchmarking' or comparisons employed to identify certain
percentile levels of compensation. 5 2 For example, the TARP
recipient must identify the entities used for benchmarking and
provide a justification for using those entities and a justification for
the lowest percentile level proposed for compensation. 53  The
TARP recipient must provide this disclosure to the Treasury and
to its primary regulatory agency within 120 days of the completion
of a fiscal year, any part of which is a TARP period.54
49. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 28,417.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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N. Prohibition on Gross- Up Payments
"TARP recipients are prohibited from providing (formally
or informally) tax gross-ups to any of the SEOs and next twenty
most highly compensated employees during the TARP period,"
except in extremely limited circumstances. 5 The Interim Final
Rule clarifies that the term "gross-up" means any reimbursement
of taxes owed with respect to any compensation (other than a
payment under a tax equalization agreement to take into account
foreign taxes). 6 The prohibition on gross-ups includes a right to a
payment of such a gross-up at a future date, even if it is after the
TARP period. 7
III. FEDERAL BANK REGULATORY AGENCIES AND RISK
ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATION
A. The Fed's Proposed Guidance on Sound Incentive
Compensation
On October 27, 2009, the Fed issued its Guidance on
incentive compensation in an effort to ensure that the use of
incentive compensation at financial institutions does not
encourage excessive risk taking and run contrary to the safety and
soundness of the company. Financial institutions have too often
rewarded employees for increasing short-term profits or revenues
without paying attention to the risks that the activities that
generate such returns pose to the company. 9  Incentivized
compensation arrangements often pressure employees to take
risks that are beyond the company's tolerance. 60 Furthermore, the
55. TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
at 28,417.
56. Id. at 28,409.
57. Id. at 28,417.
58. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4. The Fed's proposed policy
applies to "banking organizations," which it defines as "U.S. bank holding
companies, state member banks, Edge and agreement corporations, and the U.S,
operations of foreign banks with a branch, agency, or commercial lending company in
the United States. Id. at 55,231 n.1.
59. Id.at 55,227.
60. Id. at 55,228.
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discouragement of such behavior cannot always be left to the
shareholders because too often they are willing to tolerate unsafe
amounts of risk for the prospect of financial reward.61 As a result,
the Fed has decided that it must institute guidance that will help
protect the safety and soundness of a financial institution, and to
take an active supervisory role in seeing to it that proper
compensation arrangements are implemented. 62 There are three
key principles to the Fed's Guidance: "(i) provide employees
incentives that do not encourage excessive risk taking beyond the
organization's ability to effectively identify and manage risk; (ii)
be compatible with effective controls and risk management; and
(iii) be supported by strong corporate governance, including active
and effective oversight by the organization's board of directors.,
63
1. Balanced Risk-Taking Incentives
An incentive compensation arrangement is balanced when
it takes into account the risks and the benefits of employee
activities that may trigger such incentives and weighs those against
the safety and soundness of the company.64 Under this approach,
two employees who generate the same amount of revenue or
profit should not receive the same amount of incentive
compensation; rather the employee whose activities were riskier
should receive less.65 In order to develop a proper balance,
financial institutions must consider the full range of risks including
credit, market, liquidity, operational, legal, compliance, and
reputational.66 Further, the consideration should be for all current
and potential risks, including the cost and amount of capital that
may be necessary in preserving the safety and soundness of the
company.67 In order to maintain balanced incentive compensation
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4 at 52,232.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 55,233.
67. Id. at 55,233.
2010]
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arrangements, financial institutions must modify the arrangement
as needed.68
Currently, there are four methods for making
compensation more sensitive to risk. One is that awards should be
risk-adjusted, meaning that financial awards should be adjusted
based on the risk the employee's activities create. 69 There is also
the use of deferral payments, which delays the actual payout of an
award to the employee to take into account the losses or other
outcomes of the risk associated activities that are not always clear
until much later.0 Longer performance periods are an alternative
and, similar to the use of deferral payments, allow for the risks to
materialize before the payment of an award.7' The fourth
approach currently is to reduce the amount by which an award
increases as an employee achieves higher and higher performance
thresholds.72
A financial institution must further tailor its approach for
achieving balanced incentive compensation to account for the
differences between employees.73 For example, the same incentive
structure will not be applicable to an executive and to a non-
executive employee, and there may be differences between
executives and between non-executive employees.74 Also required
under the Guidance is the careful consideration of "golden
parachutes" and "golden handshakes" because the use of such
incentives can often lead to excessive risk taking activities that
impact the safety and soundness of the company. Finally, any
and all approaches a financial institution implements to balance
incentive compensation with risk must be disclosed to the
employees so that they are aware of the ways risk is taken into
account in determining their incentive compensation.76
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4 at 55,233.
71. Id. at 55,234.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4 at 55,235.
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2. Compatibility With Effective Controls and Risk Management
The Guidance calls for all financial institutions to establish
risk management processes and the proper internal controls to
ensure that balanced compensation arrangements are being
implemented. 7 There will no doubt be employees who try to
evade the processes, and therefore, financial institutions should
conduct regular internal reviews to make sure that the processes
and controls in place are being followed.78 However, in order for
this all to work, the financial institution must put into place the
appropriate personnel to oversee the processes and compensation
arrangements. The risk management personnel must have an
understanding of the risks and potential outcomes of employee
activities. 9 To retain the proper personnel that have the skills and
experience necessary to fulfill the risk management role, the
compensation arrangements for such personnel themselves must
be sufficient.8° Finally, at all times the processes and controls must
be monitored and revised as needed to ensure that compensation
arrangements are balanced.1
3. Strong Corporate Governance
The third principle in the Guidance calls for maintaining
strong corporate governance. This requires that the board of
directors of each financial institution play an active role in the
oversight of the incentive compensation arrangements."' The
Guidance places the ultimate burden upon the board to make sure
that compensation arrangements are balanced and do not put the
company's safety and soundness at risk.83  Additionally, the
Guidance suggests that the board directly approve the
compensation arrangements for any senior executives due to the
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 55,236.
81. Id.
82. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4 at 55,236.
83. Id.
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fact that senior executives themselves will be actively involved in
the risk management process. 84
The board is also responsible for monitoring the
performance and design of the compensation arrangements." This
will require the board to receive data and analysis regarding the
compensation arrangements regularly, and to evaluate the
information on a forward-looking basis as well as backward-
looking basis.86 The board may want to consider establishing a
committee of non-executive directors that is responsible for
overseeing the compensation arrangements and reporting them to
the entire board.87 Additionally, the board should be given the
ability to hire a third-party consultant to help it make sure that the
compensation arrangements are in line with the safety and
soundness of the company. 88 To provide oversight over the
board's functions the financial institution must disclose certain
amounts of information regarding compensation arrangements
and the risk management process to shareholders, so that they may
be able to take appropriate actions as necessary.89 The Guidance
also points out that large, complex financial institutions should
follow a systemic approach with formal policies, procedures, and
systems in order to ensure compensation arrangements are
balanced and consistent with safety and soundness.90
4. Supervisory Initiatives
The Fed is also proposing to play a supervisory role in the
implementation of safe and sound incentive compensation
arrangements by financial institutions.91 The two initiatives are to
develop "(i) a special horizontal review of incentive compensation
practices at large complex banking organizations (LCBOs); and
(ii) a review of incentive compensation practices at other banking
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4 at 55,236.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 55,229.
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organizations as part of the risk-focused examination process for
these organizations." 92
a. LCBOs
LCBOs are of particular importance because they are the
most likely to use incentive compensation arrangements and the
most likely to effect the broader financial system.93 Each LCBO,
therefore, will be required to submit certain information and
documentation to the Fed describing the financial institution's
current incentive compensation practices and future plans for
improving such practices.94  Thereafter, the Fed will work
individually with each company to ensure that the company has
balanced incentive compensation arrangements.9 The overall
purpose of the in-depth supervision of LCBOs is to (i) understand
the current practices and plans for improving the balance of
incentive compensation arrangements; (ii) assess the strength of
certain controls; (iii) understand the role of the board of directors
and other risk management personnel; and (iv) identify emerging
best practices. 96 The Fed also reserves the right to take supervisory
action if the financial institution fails to develop, submit, or adhere
to a plan designed to prevent excessive risk-taking.97
b. Community and Regional Banking Organizations
Community and regional banking organizations will not be
overseen as extensively as the LCBOs. Rather the review of their
incentive compensation arrangements will be conducted as part of
the risk-management reviews normally conducted. 9 The reviews
will also be tailored to fit the scope and complexity of the financial
institution." For example, small financial institutions will not be
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4 at 55,229.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 55,238.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 55,229.
99. Id.
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required to have the same formalized approaches as larger
financial institutions.' ° Regardless, the Fed maintains the right to
take enforcement action if the incentive compensation
arrangements pose a threat to the safety and soundness of the
company.101
B. The FDIC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on
Incorporating Employee Compensation Criteria into the
Risk-Based Assessment System for Deposit Insurance
On January 12, 2010, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPR) on "Incorporating Employee Compensation Criteria Into
The Risk Assessment System."'' 2 Through the ANPR, the FDIC is
seeking to identify criteria upon which to base adjustments to the
risk-based assessment system in order to correctly price and assess
the risks presented by certain compensation programs. The FDIC
would organize these criteria to provide either a "meets" or "does
not meet" metric, which it then would use to adjust an institution's
risk-based assessment rate. 10 3
While stating that the FDIC "does not seek to impose a
ceiling on the level of compensation that institutions may pay their
employees," the proposed rulemaking indicates that compensation
programs that meet the FDIC's goals may include the following
features:
A significant portion of compensation for
employees whose business activities can
present significant risk to the institution and
who receive a portion of their compensation
according to formulas based on meeting
performance goals should be comprised of
restricted, non-discounted company stock.
100. Sound Incentive Compensation, supra note 4 at 55,238.
101. Id. at 55,229.
102. Incorporating Employee Compensation Criteria Into the Risk Assessment
System, 75 Fed. Reg. 2,823 (Jan. 19, 2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327).
103. Id. at 2,825.
[Vol. 14
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND RISK
Restricted, non-discounted company stock
would be stock that becomes available to the
employee at intervals over a period of years.
The stock would be awarded at the closing
price in effect on the day of the award.
" Significant awards of company stock should
become vested over a multi-year period and
should be subject to a look-back mechanism
(e.g., clawback) designed to account for the
outcome of risks assumed in earlier periods.
" The compensation program should be
administered by a committee of the Board
composed of independent directors with
input from independent compensation
professionals.'04
The ANPR adds that:
Under the approach contemplated above, the FDIC
could conclude that firms that are able to attest that
their compensation programs include each of the
features listed above present a decreased risk to the
DIF, and therefore would face a lower risk-based
assessment rate than those firms that could not
make such attestation. Alternatively, the FDIC
could conclude that firms that cannot attest that
their compensation programs include each of these
features present an increased risk to the DIF, and
therefore would face a higher risk-based assessment
rate than those firms that do make such
attestation.
The deadline for comments on the ANPR is thirty days
after publication in the federal register. After receiving comments,
the FDIC presumably will consider the comments and issue new
104. Id.
105. Id.
2010]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
final rules before the end of 2010. Thereafter, FDIC insured
institutions would have one more regulator examining its
executive compensation programs and expressing its opinion.
IV. SEC RULES ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION INCORPORATE
PROVISIONS FROM TARP
On December 16, 2009, the SEC published a new Final
Rule on executive compensation disclosure and corporate
governance (the Final Rule), with an effective date of February 28,
2010.16 The new Final Rule covers several separate subjects,
including a few that originated in TARP. Due to ambiguities in
the effective date provisions of the Final Rule, the SEC issued
transition guidance on the Final Rules, in Question & Answer
form, on December 22, 2009, applicable "to the filing of proxy
statements, Form 10-Ks, Form 8-Ks, Securities Act registration
statements, and Exchange Act registration statements at or around
the time of the effective date."'' 7
The most important clarification is that companies with a
fiscal year end before December 20, 2009, will not have to comply
with the new Final Rule in 2010, even if the company does not file
its 2009 Form 10-K and related proxy statement until after
February 28, 2010.08 A company with a fiscal year ended on or
after December 20, 2009, will be required to comply, unless the
definitive proxy materials and the Form 10-K are filed before
February 28, 2010.'°9
A. Disclosure of the Company's Compensation Policies and
Practices as they Relate to the Company's Risk Management
The Final Rule includes a requirement for assessing
whether the company's executive compensation plans encourage
risk taking. However, the Final Rule modifies the requirement of
106. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334.
107. SEC, Proxy Disclosure Enhancement Transition, Dec. 22, 2009, http://
www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/ pdetinterp.htm.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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EESA Section 111(b)(3) in a manner that should lessen the
burden imposed on reporting companies not subject to TARP. " °
"The [F]inal [R]ule requires a company to address its
compensation policies and practices for all employees, including
non-executive officers, if the compensation policies and practices
create risks that are reasonably likely to have a material adverse
effect on the company." ''1 The "reasonably likely" disclosure
threshold would parallel the Management Discussion and Analysis
requirement, "which requires risk-oriented disclosure of known
trends and uncertainties that are material to the business." 112 By
focusing on risks that are "reasonably likely" to have a material
adverse effect on the company, the SEC hopes the Final Rule will
only bring forth disclosures about incentives in the company's
compensation policies that are most relevant to investors, rather
than burdening them with potentially insignificant and
unnecessarily speculative information. 13 The Final Rule also
allows companies to consider compensating or offsetting steps or
controls designed to limit the risk of executive compensation
agreements.11 4  "If a company has compensation policies and
practices for different groups that mitigate or balance incentives,
these could be considered in deciding whether risks arising from
the company's compensation policies and practices for employees
are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the
company as a whole.. 1 5
Perhaps most importantly, the new disclosure requirements
will not be a part of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis
(CD&A). 6 The SEC moved the new requirements into a separate
paragraph in Item 402 of Regulation S-K, agreeing with
commenters who asserted that it would be confusing to expand the
110. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,362.
111. Id. at 68,336 (The proposed rules would have required discussion and analysis
of compensation policies if risks arising from those compensation policies "may have
a material effect on the company").
112. Id. (citing to Item 303 of Regulation S-K [17 CFR 229.303]).
113. Id. (The Final Rule also refers to a material "adverse" effect on the company,
as opposed to any "material effect" as proposed).
114. Id. at 68,336-37.
115. Id.
116. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337.
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CD&A, beyond the named executive officers, to include disclosure
compensation policies for all employees."7  Smaller reporting
companies will not be required to provide the new disclosure, even
though it is not a part of the CD&A. 8 Additionally, "the [F]inal
[R]ule does not require a company to make an affirmative
statement that it has determined that the risks arising from its
compensation policies and practices are not reasonably likely to
have a material adverse effect on the company."" 9
The Final Rule contains a "non-exclusive list" of situations
where compensation arrangements have the potential to create
material risk for a company, and examples of the types of issues
that could raise discussions. 20 This list includes compensation
policies and practices:
* At a business unit of the company that
carries a significant portion of the company's
risk profile;
" At a business unit with compensation
structured significantly differently than other
units within the company;
" At a business unit that is significantly more
profitable than others within the company;
" At a business unit where the compensation
expense is a significant percentage of the
unit's revenues; and
* That vary significantly from the overall risk
and reward structure of the company, such as
when bonuses are awarded upon
accomplishment of a task, while the income
and risk to the company from the task
extend over a significantly longer period. 2'
117. Id. (Note also that a separate provision of the Final Rule requires a discussion
of the board's role in risk oversight see § 229.407(h) (Item 407)).
118. Id. (Smaller reporting companies are permitted to provide the scaled
disclosures specified in Items 402(1) through (r) of Regulation S-K, rather than the
disclosure specified in Items 402(a) through (k) of Regulation S-K).
119. Id. at 68,338.
120. Id. at 68,337.
121. Id.
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Although the Final Rule only requires disclosure if the
compensation policies create risks that are reasonably likely to
have a material adverse effect on the company, as we learned from
the 2006 changes to the executive compensation disclosure rules, 2
when the SEC gives examples of issues that could be important,
the company's proxy statement should address those issues, or the
company likely will receive a comment letter from the SEC Staff.
Similarly, the Final Rule includes examples of issues that
would potentially be appropriate for a company to address,
including:
" The general design philosophy of the
company's compensation policies and
practices for employees whose behavior
would be most affected by the incentives
established by the policies and practices, as
such policies and practices relate to or affect
risk taking by those employees on behalf of
the company, and the manner of their
implementation;
" The company's risk assessment or incentive
considerations, if any, in structuring its
compensation policies and practices or in
awarding and paying compensation;
* How the company's compensation policies
and practices relate to the realization of risks
resulting from the actions of employees in
both the short-term and the long-term, such
as through policies requiring clawbacks or
imposing holding periods;
* The company's policies regarding
adjustments to its compensation policies and
practices to address changes in its risk
profile;
* Material adjustments the company has made
to its compensation policies and practices as
122. SEC Release No. 33-8732A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53518 (Aug. 29,2006).
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a result of changes in its risk profile; and
The extent to which the company monitors
its compensation policies and practices to
determine whether its risk management
objectives are being met with respect to
incentivizing its employees.123
The Final Rule also requires companies to describe the
board's role in the oversight of risk in the corporate governance
disclosure section of the proxy statement, beginning in 2010.124
The SEC believes that risk oversight is a key competence of the
board, and that additional disclosures will improve investor and
shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the
company's risk management practices. 12  Disclosure about the
board's involvement in the oversight of the risk management
process, including credit risk, liquidity risk, and operational risk,
will "provide important information to investors about how a
company perceives the role of its board and the relationship
between the board and senior management in managing the
material risks facing the company.
126
The Final Rule gives companies the flexibility to describe
how the board administers its risk oversight function, whether
through the whole board, a separate risk committee, or an audit
committee.127 "Where relevant, companies may want to address
whether the individuals who supervise the day-to-day risk
management responsibilities report directly to the board as a
whole or to a board committee or how the board or committee
otherwise receives information from such individuals." '1 8 The
Final Rule adopts the phrase "risk oversight" instead of "risk
management" to describe the board's responsibilities in this area.1 9
The Final Rule also adopts the phrase "board leadership
structure" instead of "company leadership structure" to clarify
123. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337.
124. Id. at 68,365.
125. Id. at 68,345.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128, Id. at 68,337.
129. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337.
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that the Final Rule does not require a discussion of a company's
management leadership structure."3
Finally, the Final Rule requires registered investment funds
to provide disclosure about the board's role in risk oversight. 3
Funds face a number of risks, including investment risk,
compliance, and valuation, the SEC believes these additional
disclosures will provide investors with a better understanding of
the board's role in a fund's risk management practices."'
B. Disclosure Regarding Compensation Consultants
Additionally, the Final Rule amends Item 407 of
Regulation S-K to require disclosure about the fees paid to
compensation consultants (and their affiliates) when the
consultants were involved in determining or recommending the
compensation arrangements of any executive or director, and
provided other services to the company."3 The Final Rule also
requires a description of the role of the compensation consultant
in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive
or director compensation under the current disclosure rules.34
If the board or compensation committee has an internal
consultant the Final Rule requires fee and related disclosure if the
consultant (or any affiliate) provides other non-executive
compensation consulting services to the company, the fees for
which exceed $120,000 for a fiscal year."3 It must further be
disclosed whether the decision to engage the compensation
consultant (or its affiliates) for non-executive compensation
consulting services was made or recommended by management,
and whether those services where approved by the board.36
In situations where the board has not engaged an internal
consultant, the Final Rule requires fee disclosures if there is a
consultant (including affiliates) providing executive compensation
130. Id.
131. Id. at 68,345.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 68,345.
134. Id. at 68,347.
135. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,347.
136. Id.
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consulting services and non-executive compensation consulting
services to the company, only if the fees for non-executive
compensation consulting services exceed $120,000 for the
company's fiscal year.137
If the board has its own consultant, the company need not
provide fee and related disclosure for consultants that work with
management (whether for only executive compensation consulting
services or for both executive compensation consulting and other
non-executive compensation consulting services).'3
The Final Rule does not treat "services involving only
broad-based non-discriminatory plans or the provision of
information, such as surveys, that are not customized for the
company, or are customized based on parameters that are not
developed by the consultant," as executive compensation
consulting services. 9
The SEC apparently believes that the new disclosure
requirements will provide investors with information that will
enable them to better assess the potential conflicts a compensation
consultant may have in recommending executive compensation,
and the compensation decisions made by the board.
4°
C. Reporting of Stock and Option Awards in the Summary
Compensation and Other Tables
The Final Rule requires companies to report stock and
option awards in the Summary Compensation Table (SCT), and
the Director Compensation Table (DCT) using the full aggregate
grant date fair value of the award, as calculated under FASB ASC
Topic 718, instead of the current requirement to report only the
annual accounting charge.4
The Final Rule also significantly changes the reporting of
performance-based awards by requiring that they be reported
based on the probable outcome of the performance condition,
137. Id. at 68,345.
138. Id. at 68,347.
139. Id. at 68,345.
140. Id. at 68,346.
141. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,360.
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rather than the amount payable for maximum performance. 42
This will square the proxy reporting treatment with the accounting
treatment. The SEC acknowledged that requiring companies to
disclose an award's value based on maximum performance could
overstate the intended level of compensation and result in investor
misinterpretation of compensation decisions, which also could
discourage the grant of awards with difficult - or any -
performance conditions.'43 However, under the Final Rule, the
company must report the potential maximum award value
information in a footnote to the SCT or DCT.'"
D. Other Issues
1. Enhanced Director and Nominee Disclosure
The Final Rule requires companies to disclose for each
director and any nominee for director the experiences,
qualifications, attributes, or skills that led the board to conclude
that the person should serve as a director for the company as of
the time that a filing containing this disclosure is made with the
SEC.' The Final Rule requires that companies make this
disclosure annually because the composition of the entire board is
important information for voting decisions. This new disclosure
will be required for all directors, including those not up for
reelection in a particular year.146
The Final Rule does not require companies to disclose the
specific experience, qualifications, or skills that qualify a person to
serve as a committee member.4 4 Notably, the SEC deleted the
reference to "risk assessment skills" that was included in the
proposed rules.'4 However, the Final Rule provides that if the
Board chose an individual to be a director because of a particular
qualification, attribute, or experience related to service on a
142. Id. at 68,362.
143. Id. at 68,339.
144. Id. at 68,362.
145. Id. at 68,341.
146. Id. at 68,342.
147. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,343.
148. Id. at 68,343.
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specific committee then that should be disclosed as part of the
individual's qualifications to serve on the board.1
49
The Final Rule also "requires disclosure of any
directorships at public companies and registered investment
companies held by each director and nominee at any time during
the past five years."'' 0  The SEC believes that expanding this
disclosure will allow investors to evaluate whether a director's or
nominee's past board experience, as well as professional or
financial relationships present a potential conflict of interest. 5'
2. Disclosures About Board Leadership Structure
The Final Rule requires changes to companies' 2010 proxy
statement corporate governance disclosures. The Final Rule
imposes "new disclosure requirements under Item 407 of
Regulation S-K and makes a corresponding amendment to Item 7
of Schedule 14A to require disclosure of:" (i) the company's
leadership structure, and (ii) why the company believes it is the
most appropriate structure for it.15 2  A company is required to
disclose whether and why it chose to either combine or separate
the positions of chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair, and
why it believes that this board leadership structure is the most
appropriate structure for the company.153 The SEC states that
these provisions "are intended to provide investors with more
transparency about the company's corporate governance, but are
not intended to influence a company's decision regarding its board
leadership structure. 1 4  However, they appear intended to
incentivize companies to implement a separation of the CEO and
board chair positions.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 68,345 (The Final Rule also lengthens the time during which disclosure
of legal proceedings involving directors, director nominees and executive officers is
required from five to ten years, "as a means of providing investors with more
extensive information regarding an individual's competence and character," and
expands the list of legal proceedings for which it requires disclosure.).
152. Id. at 68,344.
153. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,344.
154. Id. at 68,345.
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3. Reporting of Voting Results on Form 8-K
The Final Rule makes one important change to reporting
requirements for Form 8-K. The Final Rule transfers the
requirement to disclose shareholder vote results from Forms 10-Q
and 10-K to Form 8-K.' New Item 5.07 to Form 8-K requires
companies to disclose the results of a shareholder vote and to have
that information filed within four business days after the vote was
held compared to what could be a few month before voting results
are disclosed in a Form 10-Q or 10-K.5 6 The SEC acknowledged
that there might be situations, such as contested elections, where
the company may need a longer period to determine definitive
voting results.15 Therefore, the SEC expanded the instructions to
Form 8-K to require companies to file the preliminary voting
results within four business days after the shareholders' meeting,
and to then file an amended report on Form 8-K within four
business days after the final voting results are known.' However,
the Final Rule provides that if a company obtains definitive voting
results before the preliminary voting results must be reported, it
does not have to report its preliminary voting results on the Form
8-K.59 The SEC also noted that the revisions to Form 8-K do not
preclude a company from announcing preliminary voting results
during the shareholder meeting at which the vote was taken and
before filing the Form 8-K.16
4. Foreign Private Issuers
The Final Rule does not contain an explicit exception from
disclosure for foreign private issuers, but the Final Rule only
applies to the extent the underlying rules of 402 apply. The
introduction to Item 402 provides an exception for private issuers:
155. Id. at 68,350.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,350.
160. Id.
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(a) General. (1) Treatment of foreign private
issuers. A foreign private issuer will be deemed to
comply with this Item if it provides the information
required by Items 6.B and 6.E.2 of Form 20-F, with
more detailed information provided if otherwise
made publicly available or required to be disclosed
by the issuer's home jurisdiction or a market in
which its securities are listed or traded.
161
V. OTHER PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
Democrats in Congress introduced nearly a dozen bills' 62 on
executive compensation issues in 2009, and the House even passed
one.16 1 Most of the provisions and restrictions of these proposed
bills are similar to those imposed by TARP. Some of the proposed
bills would apply only to financial institutions, while others would
apply to all public companies.
No one can be certain of whether the full Congress will
pass, or the President will sign, any of these bills into law, or what
the final wording of the bills will be. However, nearly all of the
bills have a few common provisions that could become law in 2010
or 2011. These common provisions are discussed below.
161. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2008).
162. See Ending Excessive Corporate Deductions for Stock Options Act, S. 1491,
111th Cong. (introduced by Levin (D-MI), on July 22, 2009 and referred to the
Senate Finance Committee); Corporate Governance Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 3272,
111th Cong. (introduced by Ellison (D-MN), on July 21, 2009 and referred to the
House Committee on Financial Services); Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009,
H.R. 2861, 111th Cong. (introduced by Peters (D-MI), on June 12, 2009);
Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (introduced by Schumer
(D-NY), on May 19, 2009 and referred to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee); Excessive Pay Shareholder Approval Act, S. 1006, 111th Cong.
(introduced by Durbin (D-IL) on May 7, 2009 and referred to the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee); Excessive Pay Capped Deduction Act, S.
1007, 111th Cong. (introduced by Durbin (D-IL) on May 7, 2009 and referred to the
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee); Pay for Performance Act
of 2009, H.R. 1664, 111th Cong. (introduced by Grayson (D-FL) and approved by the
House on April 1, 2009); Compensation Fairness Act of 2009, S. 651, 111th Cong.
(introduced by Baucus (D-MT) on March 19, 2009); Restoring American Financial
Stability Act of 2009, 111th Cong. (introduced by Dodd (D-CT)).
163. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173,
111th Cong. § 2004 (2009).
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A. Say on Pay
Similar to TARP, nearly all of the proposed bills would
require that any proxy or consent or authorization for an annual
meeting of the shareholders to elect directors, occurring on or
after a specified effective date, provide for a separate shareholder
vote to approve the compensation of named executive officers
(NEOs), as disclosed pursuant to SEC requirements. This vote
would not be binding on the company. However, shareholder
activists would almost certainly vote against the directors of any
company that did not make changes in response to a negative say
on pay vote.
B. Disclosure and Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachute
Compensation
Most of the proposed bills also would require that any
proxy for an annual meeting of shareholders provide for a separate
shareholder vote to approve any "golden parachute agreements"
maintained by the company. Again, this vote would not be
binding on the company. However, shareholder activists would
almost certainly vote against the directors of any company that did
not make changes in response to a negative vote.
C. Separation of CEO and Chairman Roles
Most of the proposed bills would require that affected
companies (generally, all publicly traded companies) split the roles
of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer between
two individuals.
D. Clawback Provisions
Most bills would require companies to develop and
implement a clawback provision that would (i) be triggered by a
financial restatement, (ii) cover all executive officers, and (iii)
require recovery of all incentive-based compensation (including
stock options) from the executive officers (both current and
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former) for a period preceding the restatement in excess of what
they would have been paid under the restatement.
E. Shareholder Reporting
Several of the bills would require every institutional
investment manager to report at least annually how they voted on
any say on pay or golden parachute vote given to shareholders.
F. Independent Compensation Committee
Nearly all of the proposed bills would require that public
companies' board Compensation Committees to meet certain
heightened independence standards, although, as a practical
matter, most public companies' Compensation Committees
already meet these standards.
G. Independent Compensation Consultant
Nearly all of the proposed bills also would allow the board
Compensation Committees of public companies to have the ability
to retain their own compensation consultant, independent from
any consultant used by management or the company generally.
Most bills also would require the public companies to disclose
whether they have retained an independent compensation
consultant.
H. Risk Assessments
Most of the proposed bills would require that public
companies prohibit compensation policies and plans that
encourage inappropriate risks that could: (1) threaten the safety
and soundness of the company; or (2) have serious adverse effects
on the company's financial stability. Most bills also would require
a public company to assess its compensation plans for risk and
disclose the results of that assessment.
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L Disclosure Regarding Employee Hedging
Like TARP, most bills would prohibit - or at least require
explicit disclosure of - whether a company permits its employees
to purchase financial instruments that are designed to hedge or
offset market declines affecting company stock awards.
VI. Focus ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION RISK ASSESSMENT FOR
2010
TARP requires covered financial institutions to implement
compensation arrangements that exclude incentives for executive
officers of a financial institution to take unnecessary and excessive
risks that threaten the value of the institution during the period
that the Treasury holds an equity or debt position in the financial
institution. Now the SEC's Final Rule imposes a similar
requirement affecting every public company, including financial
institutions
A. The SEC's Final Rule
The SEC's Final Rule requires an institution to address its
compensation policies and practices for all employees, including
non-executive officers, to determine if the compensation policies
and practices create risks that are reasonably likely to have a
material adverse effect on the institution, beginning with proxy
statements filed on or after February 28, 2010.'64 Therefore, nearly
every publicly traded financial institution in America must assess,
in early 2010, whether its executive and employee compensation
plans and agreements create risk. The Final Rule also allows
companies to consider compensating or offsetting steps or controls
designed to limit risks of certain compensation arrangements when
addressing compensation policies and practices. 65  Part III
discussed the Final Rule in detail.166
164. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68334 (for companies with
fiscal years ending after December 20, 2009).
165. Id. at 68,336.
166. See supra Part III.
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B. Companies Must Adopt a Process for Assessing Risk
Because every institution of every size has a different risk
profile, there can be no "one size fits all" program for conducting
the required risk assessment. However, many of the procedural
steps to conduct a thorough and compliant risk assessment will be
the same for most institutions.
Additionally, risk assessments inevitably will fail to catch or
fully disclose some risks that lead to a loss - which in turn leads to
a groundless lawsuit brought against the company that will cost it
time and money to defend or settle. As in the case of internal
investigations, the institution should consider that plaintiffs'
lawyers could use its risk assessment materials as a roadmap for
litigation against the institution. Therefore, it is critical for an
institution to carefully design and follow procedures that will
demonstrate its best efforts to uncover and mitigate unnecessary
risk.167
1. Develop an Action Plan
An institution should develop a thorough process or action
plan for assessing risk in its compensation programs. This action
plan would create a structure (or starting point) for the assessment
and set forth many of the steps that would be required of any
institution, its board of directors, or the board's Compensation
Committee for the risk assessment process. The institution's
counsel and its compensation consultants should provide a list of
factors that can help identify executive and employee
compensation practices that create incentives for excessive risk
taking, and discuss ways to manage or mitigate these risk factors.
2. Organization
Before diving into the risk assessment process, the board or
Compensation Committee should sort through several
organizational matters. One of the first matters is selecting the
167. It also is critical for institutions to understand the discoverability of
documents created and the communications made during an assessment.
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parties who should be involved in the process. At a minimum, the
team must include the institution's senior risk officer (SRO) or an
employee acting in a similar capacity, and the board's
Compensation Committee. Other involved parties could include:
* The Audit Committee of the board;
* Other individual board members;
* Other institution personnel involved in risk
management;
" C-suite executives;
• The institution's general counsel or other
chief legal officer;
* Expert outside legal counsel; and/or
* An experienced compensation consultant.
From time-to-time during the process, the SRO, legal
counsel, and other team members should consider whether the
team should add any other members of management or the board
or outside advisors.
A project leader should take particular care to ensure that
there is at least coordination, if not consistency, regarding risk
management and no duplication of effort as between the
Compensation Committee, the Risk Committee, the Audit
Committee, and/or other appropriate committees. As a
preliminary matter, the institution should consider how much of
the risk assessment process the Audit Committee of the board is
already handling (or should handle). Audit Committees generally
are familiar with risk. However, Audit Committees often are not
familiar with compensation practices and metrics, or the
institution's business strategy, as reinforced by its incentive plans.
Additionally, the Audit Committee already may have as many
duties and responsibilities as it can handle.
The Committee or project leader also should review
existing risk management policies (including corporate governance
guidelines and committee charters). Institutions already make a
general risk disclosure in Form 10-K. NYSE Listed Company
Manual Section 303A.07(c)(iii)(D) also requires a risk discussion.
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3. Who Should Manage the Process?
If the institution has a disclosure committee (which most
do), that committee likely has established a process to determine
what is material to the institution and what is not. That standard
could be useful to incorporate here. For example, such a process
might provide that any transaction, action, matter or issue that
would impact net revenues by one percent or more than $X, must
come to this committee for potential materiality review. Most
financial institutions have a risk committee or group that could
provide input on what are material institution-level risks-
including reputational risks. It might be prudent for the institution
to define first what its business goals are, then determine how the
compensation arrangements can be best suited to achieve those
goals, and what strategies would not be appropriate as they could
cause behavior that threatens the value of the institution.
Each financial institution faces different material risks
given the unique nature of its business and the markets in which it
operates. Therefore, the Compensation Committee should discuss
with the institution's SROs the risks (including long-term as well
as short-term) that the institution faces that could threaten the
value of the institution.
Ideally at this meeting the institution's SROs might
describe the five to ten areas of risk that, in their opinion, could
threaten the value of the financial institution. The parties then
would discuss whether each element of the institution's
compensation program could create incentives that encourage
excessive risks in those areas. The committee should keep detailed
meeting minutes of these discussions. One of the obvious items
for a compensation committee to review carefully is asymmetrical
incentive structures that have a highly leveraged upside payoff
with limited or no downside. When an SEO (or other employee)
is insulated from risk, he or she may behave differently than if the
SEO were fully exposed to that risk.
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4. What Makes a Compensation Program Risky?
The following are a few simplified examples of
compensation program features that, under the Final Rule, could
provide too much incentive for executives to take risk or otherwise
manipulate financial results:
* The institution's annual (or long-term) bonus
plan provides for a payout equal to 100% of
base salary if the institution achieves a
specified earnings per share (EPS) target -
and no payout if the institution fails to
achieve that target.
Risk implications: Executives are already
under enormous pressure to achieve
announced or expected EPS figures. This
all-or-nothing approach would only
exacerbate the problem. Instead, the
institution should consider bonus payouts at
90% of base salary for achieving EPS that is
barely below the target and straight-line
interpolation downward for other, lesser
performance targets.
" The institution provides equity incentive
compensation solely in the form of stock
options. Many of the stock options are
underwater (i.e., the exercise or strike price
is above the stock's current market price).
Risk implications: Executives need to "hit a
grand slam home run" in terms of
performance in order to see any return on
their stock options. Slow, but steady, growth
may not be enough. Ideally, the institution
would provide part of its equity
compensation in restricted stock or restricted
stock units (RSUs), so that executives will
receive some benefit for navigating through
difficult financial times.
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The institution maintains an employee
compensation program that provides cash
incentive pay based on the number of
transactions the employee makes, without a
qualitative requirement (e.g., did the
transactions create profit for the institution
and, if so, at what risk?).
Risk implications: If an employee is paid for
the number of mortgages he or she
originates, the employee may not exercise
sound underwriting standards in determining
whether to make a particular mortgage loan.
The compensation should be tied to how the
mortgage loan performs over time so that the
employee's incentive is to make a sound
loan, rather than just to generate a large
volume of loans.
5. Make a List
The committee or project leader must create a list of all
executive and employee plans maintained by the institution, which
the team must review within the timeline of the process. The new
risk review requirement, relates to all employee plans, thus greatly
expanding the number and types of plans for which the committee
is responsible, compared to current SEC requirements, which only
apply to plans covering the top five NEOs. Some institutions have
dozens of incentive and variable pay plans applicable to their sales
force alone. A lower level committee or a subcommittee could
review most of the plans that do not apply to NEOs, so the
committee can continue to focus on the five to ten plans that are
material to the institution.
6. Do it Right the First Time - But Plan for the Future
The committee or project leader should establish a timeline
(including compliance dates) for the risk assessment process and,
with the assistance of counsel, organize a series of meetings among
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the parties. In some cases, outside counsel should conduct the
meetings from an outline to ensure that the parties involved:
* Follow each of the steps;
" Ask all of the right questions;
* Get all of the right answers;
* Consider all necessary materials and
information;
" Use their outside experts;
• Deliberate, if necessary;
" Reach all of the necessary conclusions;
" Document all of the foregoing through
meeting minutes; and
" Follow through with the appropriate SEC
reporting and disclosure.
During the process, the committee or project leader also
should develop a framework and fine-tune the process for
conducting the executive and employee compensation risk
assessment, with input and guidance from all involved parties. The
committee or project leader will need to develop written policies
relating to risk management for the future.
7. SRO Risk Assessment and Report
The substantive part of the risk review process is
understanding and differentiating between those forms of
compensation that encourage appropriate risk and those that
encourage excessive risk. Shareholders want management to take
some risks with the institution's capital in order to achieve higher
returns. However, ownership generally does not want
management to take too much risk, unmanaged risk, unreasonable
risk, or unknown risk. The challenge is to achieve the appropriate
balance of risk and reward in executive compensation programs.
Each institution faces different material risks given the unique
nature of its business and the markets in which it operates.
The SRO, on behalf of the committee, and with input and
guidance from other involved parties, should conduct a risk
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assessment of the institution's executive and employee
compensation plans and programs to identify the features of the
plans and programs (or their administration) that could induce the
executives or employees to take risks. The SRO and the
committee also must determine whether each identified risk is
material. In preparation for doing so, the SRO (and his or her
team) should be briefed by human resources executives and the
committee's compensation consultant on the philosophy and
design of the executive and employee compensation programs and
the performance metrics, payout curves, and other factors that
drive incentive payouts.
The SRO also should become familiar with (i) how the
CEO and the committee evaluate individual executive's and
employee's performance for purposes of allocating rewards and
promotions, (ii) the factors and process the committee and board
use in evaluating the CEO's performance, and (iii) the
complexities and potential consequences of certain events and
decisions on each compensation program.
The SRO, with input and guidance from all involved
parties, should identify the short- and long-term risks the
institution faces according to the following general categories:
, Employee compensation plans or features
that encourage the manipulation of reported
earnings of the institution to enhance the
compensation of an employee.
" Risks that endanger the institution's
existence as an ongoing enterprise.
* Risks that pose material harm to the
institution's value including a review of
factors identified in the Final Rule.
" Reputational risks, which include exposure
to criticism or an adverse public image with
shareholders and customers, difficulty with
proxy voting on proposals regarding
executive compensation or share availability,
and board embarrassment - particularly
regarding severance arrangements.
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* Financial risk.
" Operational risk.
" Liquidity risk.
• Litigation risk.
• Regulatory risk.
* Customer risk.
8. Compensation Committee Assessment, Response, and
Implementation
Once the SRO has completed its assessment and report, it
should meet with the committee and other involved parties to
review the assessment and report. The SRO, team leader and
other involved parties should have separated out the plans,
programs, or features that do not pose a material financial,
reputational, or other risk to the institution, or otherwise
encourage the manipulation of reported earnings to enhance
employee compensation.
Most compensation plans contain incentives that create
some risk. However, because the risk assessment process requires
a review of all employee plans and programs, many of these plans
will:
" Be at an employee level where the amount
of risk is very low, or
* Involve risks that are not material or are
clearly well managed or mitigated.
The Compensation Committee should discuss the SRO's
report and evaluate or deliberate over the alternative methods of
reducing, managing, or mitigating: (a) the incentive to take
excessive risk, and (b) any plan features that could encourage the
manipulation of reported earnings to enhance the employee's
compensation.
The committee then should decide upon the design or
administrative changes needed, if any, to the compensation plans
in order to reduce, manage, or mitigate: (a) the incentive to take
those risks that threaten to harm the institution, and (b) plan
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features that could encourage the manipulation of reported
earnings to enhance the employee's compensation.
Recommendations for these changes could come from the SRO,
the compensation consultant (or other independent advisor),
human resources executives, legal counsel, or other expert sources.
The committee should inform the full board, the CEO, the
SRO, the Chief Legal Officer, and other involved parties of the
findings of its risk assessment, its tentative decisions, and the
program changes, if any, it is considering. The committee should
consider management and legal input. The committee (or its
chair) should brief the full board and consider board input. In
particular, the committee should discuss with the board, the CEO,
the SRO, Chief Legal Counsel, and other involved parties, any
necessary or recommended changes to the corporate governance
structure or committee charters regarding risk management. The
institution will need to disclose any changes it makes in the proxy
statement description of the board's role in the institution's risk
management, discussed further below.
Once the committee has made its final decisions based on
the results of the assessment and input of all involved parties, it
should instruct management and others as to any changes they
must make.
9. Repeating the Process
The institution will need to repeat some version of the
executive and employee compensation risk assessment process
annually. The committee should evaluate the results of the
compensation risk assessment and adopt changes to improve its
future effectiveness. The institution may find it appropriate to fold
the compensation risk assessment into an overall human resources
risk assessment conducted for the committee by the institution's
human resources and risk management staff in cooperation with
the committee's advisors. The institution should charge its
internal auditors with the responsibility of ensuring that the
institution actually follows the risk management processes and
standards it has adopted.
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10. Other Matters
During the assessment process or at its conclusion, the
institution or the committee should develop written policies and
guiding principles for proposing, establishing, and monitoring
compensation and incentive plans that can be applied institution-
wide in the future, which will make future risk assessments easier.
Although not required by law, the risk assessment team
could consider other areas of risk as part of its review. For
example, the team could review and seek to minimize the risk of
calculation errors. The committee could consider retaining the
institution's independent auditor or compensation consultant to
review management's calculation of performance measures and
the amount of the annual incentive awards to be paid to executive
officers, in order to report to the committee whether such
calculations were accurate and properly prepared.
Certain other "risks" may not threaten the value of the
institution, but could easily be reviewed within the risk assessment
process, including the risk of drafting errors, the risk of paying too
much or too little compensation, and the risk that the institution
has misaligned its compensation programs with its strategy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The limitations on executive compensation first initiated by
the EESA and directed specifically towards financial institutions
receiving TARP funds has changed the world of executive
compensation for all publicly traded corporations. For one, no
longer are the limitations and restrictions limited solely to financial
institutions. Secondly, besides the limitations imposed under the
EESA, the Fed's Guidance and the SEC's Final Rule require a
company to go beyond evaluating the compensation policies and
practices of executives and include any employee whose
compensation is reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect
on the company. All of the programs and legislation are designed
to address one overall concern, which is to prevent institutions
from developing executive compensation packages that create
excessive risk.
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The EESA provides specific limitations such as a
prohibition on compensation plans that encourage earnings
manipulation, the awarding of bonuses, retention awards, or other
incentives, a limitation on luxury expenditures, and calls for the
implementation of a clawback provision and say on pay and more.
The Fed's proposed guidance on incentive compensation
arrangements is an outgrowth of the executive compensation
limitations of the EESA, but as the proposal states it is only
relevant to incentivized compensation. The FDIC is yet another
regulatory agency which is seeking ways to modify the risk-based
deposit insurance assessment system to account for the risk posed
by employee compensation arrangements. The SEC's Final Rule
clarifies the disclosure requirements of compensation policies and
practices, compensation consultants, stock and option awards, and
other matters regarding directors and officers, and applies to all
publicly traded corporations. Many of the proposed legislative
bills before Congress today seek to implement a combination of
the provisions addressed in the EESA and Final Rule. They
include say on pay, the disclosure of golden parachutes, and
clawback provisions, but they also include additional requirements
such as a separation of CEO and Chairman roles, shareholder
reporting, and disclosure regarding employee hedging.
The key to the successful prevention of excessive risk will
be for companies to assess properly the risks posed by executive
compensation. Every institution will need to develop a risk
assessment process unique to its structure, objectives, and risk
profile. Important considerations when developing a process
include deciding who should be involved in the process, who
should lead the process, what compensation features incentivize
excessive risk, which risks are material, and how the results of the
assessment will be implemented. Without a risk assessment
process in place that can monitor a company's compliance with the
EESA, Final Rule, and whatever other executive compensation
legislation that may be passed, companies will have a hard time
meeting executive compensation requirements.
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